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INTRODUCTION 
A man enters a hospital for a routine outpatient procedure. All appears 
to go well, and the man is recovering at home with his wife and children 
when he begins to feel ill. He returns to the hospital and discovers that he 
has developed a post-operative infection because of unsterilized tools used 
during the procedure. The improper sterilization did not result from 
negligence on the part of a doctor or nurse but rather from the service and 
maintenance of the equipment used in the sterilization process. The man, 
a husband and a father, dies because of the infection. His family soon 
learns that Louisiana jurisprudence may classify the family’s claim as one 
of “malpractice,” sweeping it under the protections of the Louisiana 
Medical Malpractice Act1 (“MMA”) and capping recovery at $500,000.2  
The average person probably associates “malpractice” with a medical 
professional erring in a professional capacity. Even scholars recognize that 
“[t]he significance of the term ‘malpractice’ is that it is used to differentiate 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2017, by SARAH NICKEL. 
 1. See Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., 187 So. 3d 436 (La. 2015). 
 2. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2(B)(1) (2017). 
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professionals from nonprofessionals for purposes of applying certain statutory 
limitations of tort liability.”3 The reality, however, is that medical professional 
involvement is not a necessary element of “malpractice” under the MMA.4 
When the Louisiana Legislature enacted the MMA, the Act gave certain 
advantages to health care providers, including limiting recovery for victims.5 
Because the Act is special legislation and deviates from the general rights of 
tort victims by limiting a tort victim’s recovery, the Act’s coverage should be 
construed strictly.6 In an effort to assist courts in determining whether an 
injury constitutes “malpractice” under the MMA, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court in Coleman v. Deno set forth six factors.7 Unfortunately, those factors 
have proven insufficient and unreliable as a test for malpractice as they are 
overly broad and open to varying interpretations.8 In the hypothetical above, 
one court may apply the factors to find coverage under the MMA while 
another court, applying the same factors, may find general tort liability.9 
Based on this determination between malpractice and general tort liability, the 
victim either will be limited to $500,000 in damages or have no limit at all.10 
In light of Louisiana’s public policy, which seeks to protect tort victims’ 
right to recovery and construe the MMA strictly, Louisiana courts should 
adopt a new, narrower test for determining whether an act constitutes 
“malpractice” under the MMA. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the MMA’s enactment, including the 
public policy concerns behind the Act, and details the advantages and 
disadvantages it entails for both health care providers and tort victims. Part 
II introduces Coleman, the source of the six-factor test, and argues that 
these factors are an insufficient test for determining malpractice claims in 
                                                                                                             
 3. Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 314–15 (La. 2002) (citing FRANK L. 
MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 21–22 (1st ed. 
1996)). 
 4. In Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., L.L.C., the Court rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument that Dupuy’s injury was not treatment-related because the “maintenance 
and service of sterilization equipment” was performed by “plant operations rather 
than physicians.” Instead, the Court found that “[t]he use of the broad term ‘health 
care provider,’ rather than simply ‘physician’ or ‘medical doctor,’ necessarily 
includes actions which are treatment related and undertaken by the Hospital in its 
capacity as a health care provider—even if those actions are not performed 
directly by a medical professional.” Dupuy, 187 So. 3d at 443. 
 5. See § 40:1231.2(B)(1). 
 6. Blevins v. Hamilton Med. Ctr., Inc., 959 So. 2d 440, 444 (La. 2007). 
 7. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 315. 
 8. See, e.g., LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hosp., L.L.C., 966 So. 2d 519 
(La. 2007). 
 9. See discussion infra Part III. 
 10. § 40:1231.2(B)(1). 
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Louisiana. Part III discusses two Louisiana Supreme Court cases, 
including the recent decision of Dupuy v. NMC Operating Company, as 
examples of the unpredictability of the Coleman factors and of a court’s 
tendency to apply these factors broadly, contrary to Louisiana’s public 
policy on interpreting the MMA. Finally, Part IV recommends legislative 
action to remedy the test for determining whether a certain claim 
constitutes malpractice and proposes an alteration of the Coleman factors 
as an interim solution for Louisiana courts. 
I. THE ENACTMENT OF THE MMA: THE ACT’S 
PROTECTIONS AND PURPOSES 
The Louisiana Legislature enacted the MMA in 1975 in an effort to 
“stabilize medical malpractice insurance rates and to assure the availability 
of affordable medical services to the public.”11 The Legislature attempted 
to accomplish these goals by reducing the number of medical malpractice 
lawsuits being filed and damages being awarded.12 In furtherance of this 
effort, the MMA provides certain advantages to qualified “health care 
providers”13 in malpractice actions. First, the Act provides a statutory limit 
                                                                                                             
 11. Hutchinson v. Patel, 637 So. 2d 415, 419 (La. 1994). 
 12. Felicia Scroggins, Differentiating Medical Malpractice and Personal 
Injury Claims in the Context of Statutory Protections: Lacoste v. Pendleton 
Methodist Hosp., L.L.C., 3 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 367, 367 (2008). 
 13. § 40:1231.1(A)(10) (defining “health care provider” as “a person, 
partnership, limited liability partnership, limited liability company, corporation, 
facility, or institution licensed or certified by this state to provide health care or 
professional services as a physician, hospital, nursing home, community blood 
center, tissue bank, dentist, a licensed dietician or licensed nutritionist employed by, 
referred by, or performing work under contract for, a health care provider or other 
person already covered by this Part, registered or licensed practical nurse or certified 
nurse assistant, offshore health service provider, ambulance service under 
circumstances in which the provisions of R.S. 40:1237.1 are not applicable, certified 
registered nurse anesthetist, nurse midwife, licensed midwife, nurse practitioner, 
clinical nurse specialist, pharmacist, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical 
therapist, occupational therapist, psychologist, social worker, licensed professional 
counselor, licensed perfusionist, licensed respiratory therapist, licensed radiologic 
technologist, licensed clinical laboratory scientist, or any nonprofit facility 
considered tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3), Internal Revenue Code, pursuant 
to 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3), for the diagnosis and treatment of cancer or cancer-related 
diseases, whether or not such a facility is required to be licensed by this state, or any 
professional corporation a health care provider is authorized to form under the 
provisions of Title 12 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, or any partnership, 
limited liability partnership, limited liability company, management company, or 
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to recovery of $500,000 “for all malpractice14 claims for injuries to or 
death of a patient, exclusive of future medical care and related benefits.”15 
Second, it requires that malpractice claims filed against health care 
providers covered by the MMA be reviewed by a medical review panel 
before the suit may be brought in a court of law.16 The medical review 
panel consists of three Louisiana-licensed health care providers and one 
non-voting attorney chair-person.17 The purpose of the panel is “to express 
its expert opinion as to whether or not the evidence supports the conclusion 
that the defendant or defendants acted or failed to act within the 
appropriate standards of care.”18 Once the panel issues its opinion, the 
plaintiff chooses whether to file a lawsuit.19 If the case goes to trial and the 
court determines that medical malpractice occurred, recovery still is 
limited by the damages cap.20 These protections were enacted in response 
                                                                                                             
corporation whose business is conducted principally by health care providers, or an 
officer, employee, partner, member, shareholder, or agent thereof acting in the 
course and scope of his employment”). 
 14. § 40:1231.1(A)(13) (defining “malpractice” as “any unintentional tort or 
any breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or 
which should have been rendered, by a health care provider, to a patient, including 
failure to render services timely and the handling of a patient, including loading 
and unloading of a patient, and also includes all legal responsibility of a health 
care provider arising from acts or omissions during the procurement of blood or 
blood components, in the training or supervision of health care providers, or from 
defects in blood, tissue, transplants, drugs, and medicines, or from defects in or 
failures of prosthetic devices implanted in or used on or in the person of a 
patient”). Subsection (A)(22) defines “tort” as: 
[A]ny breach of duty or any negligent act or omission proximately 
causing injury or damage to another. The standard of care required of 
every health care provider, except a hospital, in rendering professional 
services or health care to a patient, shall be to exercise that degree of skill 
ordinarily employed, under similar circumstances, by the members of his 
profession in good standing in the same community or locality, and to 
use reasonable care and diligence, along with his best judgment, in the 
application of his skill. 
§ 40:1231.1(A)(22). 
 15. Id. § 40:1231.2(B)(1). 
 16. Id. § 40:1231.8(A)(1)(a). 
 17. § 40:1231.8(C). 
 18. § 40:1231.8(G). 
 19. See Allison B. Lewis, Unreasonable and Imperfect: Constitutionality of 
the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act’s Limit on Recovery, 69 LA. L. REV. 417, 
420 (2009). 
 20. § 40:1231.2(B)(1) (“The total amount recoverable for all malpractice 
claims for injuries to or death of a patient, exclusive of future medical care and 
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to a perceived insurance crisis, but the Act, as well as the reasoning behind 
its enactment, continue to be questioned.21 
A. The Insurance Crisis 
The Louisiana Legislature enacted the MMA in response to what many 
of its proponents referred to as the “insurance crisis” of the 1970s.22 
Nationally, malpractice insurance premiums were rising drastically as 
commercial insurers withdrew from covering medical liability.23 In Louisiana 
alone, four medical malpractice insurance companies abandoned the market, 
leaving the state with only two providers.24 As a result, insurance premiums 
increased by as much as 300% in Louisiana.25 Commentators blamed the 
crisis on excessive damage awards and rising medical malpractice insurance 
costs.26 Proponents of medical malpractice reform statutes, such as 
Louisiana’s MMA, argued that large jury awards were causing insurance 
premium increases.27 Others, however, believed that jury awards had 
nothing to do with increases.28 Rather, actuaries believed the increases 
were a result of normal actuarial cycles.29 
Decades after the purported crisis, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeal found in Whitnell v. Silverman that the Legislature enacted the 
                                                                                                             
related benefits as provided in R.S. 40:1231.3, shall not exceed five hundred 
thousand dollars plus interest and cost.”). 
 21. See Leonard J. Nelson et al., Medical Malpractice Reform in Three 
Southern States, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 69, 71 (2008); Lewis, supra note 
19 (arguing the damages cap is unconstitutional); see also W. Taylor Hale, A 
Critical Misdiagnosis: Re-Evaluating Louisiana’s Medical Malpractice, 53 LOY. 
L. REV. 463 (2007) (arguing that the Act violates Equal Protection by not 
affording every patient with an adequate remedy); Arrington v. ER Physicians 
Group, AMPC, 940 So. 2d 777, 784 (La. Ct. App. 2006), vacated sub nom. 
Arrington v. Galen-Med, Inc., 947 So. 2d 727 (La. 2007) (finding “the 
$500,000.00 cap on medical malpractice damages unconstitutional as failing to 
provide the plaintiffs an ‘adequate remedy’ as guaranteed under the provisions of 
La. Const. art. 1, § 22”). 
 22. See Nelson et al., supra note 21, at 71. 
 23. Id. (discussing the 500% increase in premiums in some states). 
 24. Emily Townsend Black Grey, The Medical Malpractice Damages Cap: 
What is Included?, 60 LA. L. REV. 547, 547 (2000). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Lewis, supra note 19, at 418. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Whitnell v. Silverman, 646 So. 2d 989, 994 (La. Ct. App. 1994), rev’d, 
686 So. 2d 823 (La. 1996). 
 29. Id. 
316 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
Act without the benefit of actuarial evidence specifically applicable to 
Louisiana’s situation in 1975.30 In fact, the court found it likely that such 
increases were part of the normal actuarial cycle and did not warrant 
legislative action in 1975.31 This finding was based on testimony of 
actuary Robert E. Lowe, who testified that the insurance industry 
undergoes regular ten-year cycles.32 A so-called “crisis” occurs every ten 
years because insurance companies purposefully underprice the premiums 
in order to cause these “crises.”33 Lowe further testified that “[t]he 
insurance industry likes to use the term ‘crisis’ because ‘they like to get 
the sympathy of the consumer to support their efforts.’”34 Mr. Lowe 
questioned the Legislature’s basis for enacting the MMA, stating that “in 
1975 and prior thereto, medical malpractice insurance statistics were not 
separately compiled or required to be separately reported to the Insurance 
Commissioner’s Office. Thus there was no Louisiana medical malpractice 
information available at the time that the statute was passed.”35 With critics 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. The court discussed the testimony of actuary Robert Lowe: 
We agree. Perhaps the best explanation is given by actuary Robert E. 
Lowe. . . . Mr. Lowe testified that the insurance industry undergoes 
regular 10 year cycles which include a ‘crisis’ every ten years. We have 
had insurance crises in 1975, 1985, and are due one in 1995. These cycles 
are well known in the literature and have been discussed by academic 
writers and industry analysts for decades. The cycles are caused by 
underpricing by the industry itself. In order to compete for the premium 
dollar while still maintaining market share, insurance companies will 
underprice premiums for a period of time. Because they are all 
competing with each other for the same premium dollar and market 
share, they will all underprice at the same time. Mismanagement of 
pricing by the companies themselves creates a depletion of surplus, of 
loss reserves, such that pricing must increase over a short period to make 
up for the reserve depletion. As the pricing increases, it places strain on 
the insurance companies to absorb business. There is a relationship 
between the amount of business a company can write and the size of its 
surplus. When the surplus is depleted, its capacity to write new business 
decreases drastically. In order to add increasing prices in a short period 
of time at a rapid rate, the insurance companies must dispose of some 
business. Which business they dispose of is entirely within their control 
and entirely arbitrary, but the companies dispose of the business which 
they perceive to be more troublesome, such as medical malpractice and 
environmental. This disposal of business is a commonly recognized 
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questioning the reasoning behind the act’s enactment, scholars also began 
questioning its constitutionality.36 
B. The Constitutionality of the Act 
Regardless of whether the Act’s enactment was justified from a policy 
perspective, it has been subject to much constitutional scrutiny.37 As recently 
as 2006, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Arrington v. ER 
Physicians Group, APMC held the MMA’s damages cap unconstitutional 
under the state constitution’s “adequate remedy” clause.38 The court reasoned 
that the cap, enacted in 1975 and never adjusted for inflation, no longer 
provided an injured patient with a sufficient remedy.39 When the Third Circuit 
                                                                                                             
phenomenon in the insurance business and has been written about by 
many industry commentators. The insurance companies dispose or dump 
certain kinds of business by simply refusing to write certain lines. . . . 
The insurance ‘crisis’ is never a crisis to the insurance companies, who 
are in fact raising their rates rapidly. 
Id. 
 36. See Lewis, supra note 19 (arguing the damages cap is unconstitutional); 
see also Hale, supra note 21 (arguing that the Act violates Equal Protection by 
not affording every patient with an adequate remedy); Arrington v. ER Physicians 
Group, AMPC, 940 So. 2d 777, 784 (La. Ct. App. 2006), vacated sub nom. 
Arrington v. Galen-Med, Inc., 947 So. 2d 727 (La. 2007) (holding “the $500,000 
cap on medical malpractice damages unconstitutional as failing to provide the 
plaintiffs an ‘adequate remedy’ as guaranteed under the provisions of La. Const. 
art. 1, § 22”). 
 37. See Lewis, supra note 19 (arguing the damages cap is unconstitutional); 
see also Hale, supra note 21 (arguing that the Act violates Equal Protection by 
not affording every patient with an adequate remedy); see also Arrington, 940 So. 
2d at 784 (holding “the $500,000 cap on medical malpractice damages 
unconstitutional as failing to provide the plaintiffs an ‘adequate remedy’ as 
guaranteed under the provisions of La. Const. art. 1, § 22.”). 
 38. Arrington, 940 So. 2d at 784; see also LA. CONST. art. I, § 22 (“All courts 
shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of 
law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for 
injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other rights.”). 
 39. Arrington, 940 So. 2d at 781, in which the court discussed the 
insufficiency of the cap: 
The balance has been weighed heavily in favor of the health care 
providers, their insurers, and The Patient’s Compensation Fund by the 
two-thirds erosion in ‘‘the dollar’’ from 1975 to date which limits the 
value of the claim to one-third if [sic] its value in 1975, thereby violating 
the equal protection laws guaranteed by The Louisiana Constitution. 
Id. 
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adjusted the statutory $500,000 cap for inflation, that amount was only worth 
$160,000.40 The court noted that it did not stand alone in finding a cap 
unconstitutional, citing cases invalidating similar damages limitations in five 
other states.41 
Commentators have argued that the MMA’s cap on damages also 
violates the Louisiana Constitution’s equal protection clause.42 The central 
argument of these commentators is that the cap divides injured patients 
into two categories: those who can receive an adequate remedy and those 
who cannot.43 In fact, the more severe a victim’s injuries, the less likely 
the victim is to recover fully.44 For instance, a man whose arm is broken 
due to malpractice and who subsequently is awarded $10,000 by a jury 
will recover his losses fully as determined by the jury. A man who is left 
paralyzed due to malpractice and who is awarded $1 million by a jury, 
however, will be able to recover only half of his award. The greater the 
jury award exceeds the $500,000 cap, the more the injured patient 
ultimately loses.45 
Louisiana courts emphasize that, because the MMA limits tort liability 
for qualified health care providers, it is “in derogation of the rights of tort 
victims, and as such, the coverage of the [A]ct should be strictly 
construed.”46 In addition, the MMA must be construed strictly when 
considering the law’s questionable enactment purpose, its repeated 
constitutional challenges, and its limitations on a tort victim’s ability to 
recover damages fully.47 Despite the necessity of strict application, the 
Coleman factors do not lead to strict construction of the MMA; rather, the 
factors are easily manipulated. 
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE COLEMAN FACTORS 
In 2002, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided six factors for courts 
to consider when determining whether certain conduct by a qualified 
                                                                                                             
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 784 (citing cases finding medical malpractice caps unconstitutional 
in Texas, Alabama, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Florida). 
 42. See Lewis, supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 43. Lewis, supra note 19, at 425–28; Hale, supra note 21. 
 44. E.g., Taylor v. Clement, 940 So. 2d 796, 797 (La. Ct. App. 2006) 
(discussing how the plaintiff’s award was initially an amount above $500,000, but 
was reduced to the cap amount of $500,000). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Blevins v. Hamilton Med. Ctr., Inc., 959 So. 2d 440, 444 (La. 2007); 
see also Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So. 2d 577, 578 (La. 1992).  
 47. See discussion supra Part I. 
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health care provider constitutes malpractice as defined under the MMA.48 
In Coleman v. Deno, a 32-year-old man alleged that “patient dumping”49 
caused the defining delay that resulted in the need to amputate his arm to save 
his life.50 Deciding whether this act of negligence, the alleged patient 
dumping, constituted “malpractice,” the Court contemplated the meaning of 
the MMA’s definition of “malpractice.”51 The MMA defines malpractice as 
“any unintentional tort or any breach of contract based on health care or 
professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a 
health care provider, to a patient . . . .”52 The Act then defines a “tort” as 
“any breach of duty or any negligent act or omission proximately causing 
injury or damage to another.”53 Finally, “health care,” as used in the 
definition of “malpractice,” is defined as “any act or treatment performed 
or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any 
health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient’s 
medical care, treatment or confinement.”54 In addition to the legislative 
definition of “malpractice,” the Court considered three factors previously 
used in making malpractice determinations,55 as well as three additional 
factors, thus providing the six factors now known as the Coleman factors.56 
The first three factors originally were introduced in Sewell v. Doctors 
Hospital, but were not conceived by the Court.57 Rather, the factors were 
derived from an American Law Report (“ALR”).58 The first factor is 
“whether the particular wrong is ‘treatment related’ or caused by a 
dereliction of professional skill.”59 The second factor is “whether the 
wrong requires expert medical evidence to determine whether the 
                                                                                                             
 48. Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 315 (La. 2002). 
 49. “Patient dumping” is the “refusal to treat patients with emergency medical 
conditions who are uninsured and cannot pay for medical treatment or the transfer 
of such patients to a public hospital.” Spradlin v. Acadia-St. Landry Medical Found, 
758 So. 2d 116, 117 n.1 (La. 2000). 
 50. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 307–10. 
 51. Id. at 314–15. 
 52. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.1(A)(13) (2017). 
 53. § 40:1231.1(A)(22). 
 54. § 40:1231.1(A)(9). 
 55. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 315. 
 56. Id. at 316. 
 57. Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So. 2d 577, 579 n.3 (La. 1992). 
 58. Id. (quoting Holly P. Rockwell, Annotation, What Patient Claims Against 
Doctor, Hospital, or Similar Health Care Provider Are Not Subject to Statutes 
Specifically Governing Actions and Damages for Medical Malpractice, 89 A.L.R.4th 
887 (1991)). 
 59. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 315–16 (citing Sewell, 600 So. 2d at 579 n.3 (La. 
1992)). 
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appropriate standard of care was breached.”60 The third factor is “whether 
the pertinent act or omission involved assessment of the patient’s 
condition.”61  
The three additional factors came from a later version of the same 
annotation,62 which make up the fourth, fifth, and sixth Coleman factors. 
The fourth factor is “whether an incident occurred in the context of a 
physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of activities which 
a hospital is licensed to perform.”63 The fifth factor is “whether the injury 
would have occurred if the patient had not sought treatment.”64 Lastly, the 
sixth factor is “whether the tort alleged was intentional.”65 
The ALR, from which the factors were derived, consists of annotations 
on a variety of legal topics that generally are used by attorneys to learn 
about an unfamiliar area of law quickly.66 These annotations are written 
by attorneys across the country and include a full explanation of the topic 
along with relevant cases from every jurisdiction.67 Thus, these factors, 
adopted word-for-word from an annotation on medical malpractice, are 
not tailored to Louisiana, its public policy concerns, or Louisiana’s 
MMA.68 Instead, these factors are an accumulation of arguments made by 
                                                                                                             
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 316. 
 63. Id. at 315–16. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. AMERICAN LAW REPORTS, WESTLAW, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters 
.com/law-products/westlaw-legal-research/litigator/alr [https://perma.cc/3MGS- 
Y8GY]. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Rockwell, supra note 58 discusses courts’ various considerations when 
defining the scope of medical malpractice statutes: 
In defining the scope of the medical malpractice statutes as applied to 
tort claims, the courts have weighed various considerations, including 
the statutory language and legislative history, and the factual basis and 
context of a claim. When focusing on statutory language, the courts have 
tended to either define the breadth of coverage intended, as reflected in 
general statutory terms or the legislative history, or to determine whether 
a patient’s claim fell within the statutory definition of ‘treatment related,’ 
‘health care,’ ‘malpractice, error, or mistake,’ or like term, as a factual 
matter. In analyzing the factual basis of a claim, the courts may consider 
whether a particular wrong is ‘treatment related’ or was caused by a 
dereliction of professional skill or duty, whether the wrong can be 
evaluated based on common knowledge or requires expert evidence to 
determine whether the appropriate standard of care was breached, or 
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courts across the country when determining whether a claim constitutes 
malpractice under that particular state’s medical malpractice law.69 
Because these factors are not tailored to Louisiana, each factor fails to 
consider Louisiana’s public policy of protecting tort victims’ rights. The 
factors also represent a national interpretation of what “malpractice” 
means rather than the Louisiana Legislature’s intended definition of the 
term. Thus, the arbitrary use of the ALR factors has resulted in 
unpredictable malpractice determinations by Louisiana courts. 
III. THE UNRELIABLE AND UNPREDICTABLE 
NATURE OF THE COLEMAN FACTORS 
Following Coleman, Louisiana courts continue to use the six factors 
to evaluate whether a plaintiff’s claim constitutes malpractice under the 
MMA.70 Because of the Legislature’s broad and elaborate definitions 
within the MMA, courts likely viewed the Coleman factors as a simpler, 
more efficient test. But an enumerated list is not better than a structured, 
published definition—especially when that list is not tailored to Louisiana 
and is as broad as the text of the MMA. In light of the factors’ foundation, 
it is no surprise that their application has been unsuccessful in Louisiana. 
Because of the broad wording, there are instances when Louisiana courts 
have majority and dissenting opinions that apply the same six factors and 
reach different conclusions.71 For example, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
did just that in LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hospital, L.L.C. 
A. LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hospital, L.L.C.  
LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hospital involved a claim by a 
patient’s surviving family members after the patient, who was on life 
support at Pendleton Methodist Hospital, died during a power outage 
                                                                                                             
whether the act at issue involved assessment of the patient's condition. 
In addition, courts have considered factors such as whether an incident 
occurred in the context of a physician-patient relationship, or was within 
the scope of activities which a hospital is licensed to perform, whether 
the injury would have occurred if the patient had not sought treatment, 
and whether the tort alleged was intentional. 
Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. E.g., LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hosp., L.L.C., 966 So. 2d 519, 524–25 
(La. 2007). 
 71. See, e.g., id.; see also Billeaudeau v. Opelouses Gen. Hosp. Auth., 189 So. 
3d 562 (La. Ct. App. 2016). 
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following Hurricane Katrina.72 Chief Justice Calogero began his opinion 
by reiterating that the MMA “applie[s] only and strictly to cases of medical 
malpractice . . . because the [MMA] limitations on such liability were 
created by special legislation in derogation of the general rights of 
Louisiana tort victims.”73 After establishing that the hospital was a 
“qualified health care provider,” the Court proceeded to apply the 
Coleman factors, ultimately concluding that the claims against the hospital 
did not constitute malpractice but fell under general negligence.74 In 
reversing the court of appeals’ holding that these claims were malpractice 
under the MMA, the Court reiterated that the MMA limitations apply 
strictly to claims arising from medical malpractice.75 Thus, the claim did 
not have to be presented to a medical review panel, and the plaintiffs’ relief 
was not subject to the $500,000 cap.76 Justice Weimer agreed with Justice 
Knoll’s dissent, which applied the Coleman factors more broadly to reach 
the opposite conclusion.77 
In LaCoste, the plaintiffs alleged negligent and intentional acts by the 
defendant in 
designing, constructing and/or maintaining a facility in such a 
manner that the hospital did not have sufficient emergency power 
to sustain life support systems . . . by designing, constructing 
and/or maintaining a facility in such a manner that allowed flood 
waters to enter the structure, thus endangering the safety of the 
patients . . . failure to implement an adequate evacuation plan . . . 
failure to have a facility available for transfer of patients . . . failure 
                                                                                                             
 72. LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 521. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 519. 
 75. Id. at 524. The court discussed Louisiana’s public policy interest in 
avoiding derogation of tort victims’ rights: 
This court has steadfastly emphasized that the [MMA] and its limitations on 
tort liability for a qualified health care provider apply only to claims ‘arising 
from medical malpractice,’ and that all other tort liability on the part of a 
qualified health care provider is governed by general tort law. . . . This is so 
because, as we have oft repeated, the [MMA’s] limitations on the liability of 
health care providers were created by special legislation in derogation of the 
rights of tort victims. . . . In keeping with this concept, any ambiguity should 
be resolved in favor of the plaintiff and against finding that the tort alleged 
sounds in medical malpractice. The limitations of the [MMA], therefore, 
apply strictly to cases of malpractice as defined by the [MMA]. 
Id. 
 76. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.8(A)(1)(a) (2017); see also id. § 40:1231.2(B)(1). 
 77. LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 530.  
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to have in place a plan to transfer patients in the event of mandatory 
evacuation.78 
Evaluating the plaintiffs’ claims, the Court interpreted each Coleman 
factor in favor of general tort liability, enabling the plaintiffs to file their 
claim in a court of law immediately without being subject to a medical 
review panel.  
Regarding the first factor, “whether the particular wrong is ‘treatment 
related’ or caused by a dereliction of professional skill,”79 the Court rejected 
the appellate court’s reasoning that “the lack of sufficient back-up power is 
akin to a failure to have adequate equipment and, thus, a failure to provide 
medical treatment.”80 Instead, the majority found that the allegations did not 
relate to “medicine, medical care, or medical treatment.”81 The Court 
reasoned that the language used, such as “designing,” “constructing,” and 
“maintaining,” all suggested issues of premises liability or general 
negligence but not a dereliction of a professional medical skill.82 
Conversely, Justice Knoll’s dissent argued that “[b]ecause the wrong 
alleged is the failure to provide the proper ventilation care . . . the allegations 
do relate to the patient’s treatment and an alleged dereliction of the 
professional skill.”83 In her opinion, it was “overly simplistic” to find that 
the plaintiffs rested their allegations on the power failure alone.84 She argued 
that it was improper to restrict the application of the factor to the lack of 
power.85 She instead thought it was appropriate to extend the application to 
the result of what the lack of electricity caused—the failure to provide 
treatment.86 
In addressing the second factor, “whether the wrong requires expert 
medical evidence to determine whether the appropriate standard of care 
was breached,”87 the Court found that, although the details of a hospital 
emergency evacuation plan may call for expert medical evidence in some 
scenarios, the allegations at hand did not require such expert medical 
evidence.88 The claims simply did not contain any allegations against 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. at 521. 
 79. Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 315 (La. 2002). 
 80. LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 526. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 530 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
 84. Id. at 531. 
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 87. Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 315 (La. 2002). 
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“individuals with medical training, such as doctors and nurses, who failed 
to exercise proper medical skills or procedures.”89 
Justice Knoll, however, found much significance in the uniqueness of 
health care emergency preparedness.90 She argued that, because of the 
specialized nature of a hospital emergency plan, medical experts likely 
would be necessary to determine the appropriate standard of care in 
implementing the particular emergency plan.91 She also argued that “only 
physicians can issue transfer and acceptance orders, and negligence 
regarding transfer decisions and planning in evacuations likely cannot be 
established without expert medical testimony.”92 
In analyzing the third factor, “whether the pertinent act or omission 
involved assessment of the patient’s condition,”93 the Court recognized the 
defendant’s argument that “the failure-to-evacuate contention and the 
failure-to-transfer contention [were] simply other ways of saying that the 
hospital was negligent in admitting and treating [Mrs. LaCoste].”94 The 
Court found this argument unconvincing and determined that the 
plaintiffs’ petition did not make a “failure to treat” allegation.95 Based on 
the plaintiffs’ claims, the Court concluded that “determin[ing] whether 
sufficient emergency power would be available or an evacuation plan 
should be implemented” did not require the assessment of Mrs. LaCoste’s 
condition.96 
Once again, Justice Knoll viewed the application of the factors 
differently. She found that, despite the wording of the allegations, “the 
alleged wrongdoing inherently involved a medical assessment and 
evaluation of Mrs. LaCoste’s condition.”97 Justice Knoll discussed how 
decisions regarding transportation of patients “necessarily includes an 
assessment of the patient’s condition.”98 In her broad interpretation of the 
allegations, Justice Knoll expanded the plaintiffs’ claims to include 
allegations that were not made.99 The issues at hand dealt with the building 
itself and the hospital’s preparedness.100 Mrs. LaCoste’s ventilator stopped 
                                                                                                             
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 531 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
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 93. Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 315 (La. 2002). 
 94. LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 527. 
 95. Id. at 527–28. 
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running because power was lost and the hospital’s emergency plans were 
insufficient.101 Plaintiffs did not make allegations against a doctor who 
failed to transfer Mrs. LaCoste.102 
Regarding the fourth factor, “whether an incident occurred in the 
context of a physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of 
activities which a hospital is licensed to perform,”103 the hospital asserted 
that “attempting to preserve the life of a patient is an activity that a hospital 
is exclusively licensed to perform.”104 The Court disagreed as “there [was] 
no allegation in the petition that a medical decision by any physician or 
nurse resulted in the failure to transfer this patient and that such failure 
resulted in her death.”105 The Court concluded that the claims alleged did 
not involve a physician-patient relationship.106 
Justice Knoll, against the majority’s repeated warnings to avoid 
applying the factors so broadly, continued to look beyond the actual 
claims.107 Instead of looking at the allegations of the plaintiffs, she 
expanded them into “failure to transport” and “failure to provide 
treatment.”108 By transforming these allegations, she was able to argue that 
“[p]hysicians are exclusively licensed” to make decisions regarding 
transfers and that “[i]t is the failure of the treatment and care for which the 
hospital was licensed to perform that is at issue in this case and weighs 
this factor in favor the defendant's position.”109 
When analyzing the fifth factor, “whether the injury would have 
occurred if the patient had not sought treatment,”110 the Court recognized 
the difficulty in evaluating the factor because “any wrong that a patient 
suffers in a hospital or doctor’s office would not occur if the patient had 
not first entered the facility.”111 Instead of using this type of “but-for” 
rationale, the Court applied this factor in relation to its determination of 
the other Coleman factors. The Court reasoned that, because it found the 
allegations were not treatment-related, it could not interpret this factor 
reasonably in favor of malpractice.112 Conversely, Justice Knoll did apply 
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a “but-for” rationale and found that “[i]f Mrs. LaCoste had not been taken 
to the hospital for treatment of pneumonia and placement on a ventilator, 
she would not have been subject to the alleged failure of lifesaving 
care.”113 
The sixth factor, “whether the tort alleged was intentional,”114 proved to 
be of no significance in this case. The majority and Justice Knoll agreed that 
the sixth factor was irrelevant considering that there was no allegation of 
intentional wrongdoing.115 
LaCoste is a prime example of the uncertainty and unreliability of the 
Coleman factors. The same Court, analyzing the same set of facts, applied 
each factor to reach wholly contradictory conclusions. Though the majority 
applied the factors narrowly, in accordance with public policy, the dissent 
applied them broadly to find “malpractice” under the MMA. Furthermore, the 
LaCoste decision is not unique in its conflicting analysis.116 Often, a majority 
applying the Coleman factors narrowly wrestles with a dissent undermining its 
entire argument with a broad application.117 Still, other cases involve no dissent 
and, instead, a broad application of the factors prevails.118 This broad 
application, as exemplified in Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., L.L.C., is contrary 
to Louisiana’s public policy and demonstrates the need for a new malpractice 
test. In fact, even without a dissent exposing the flaws of such an application, 
the factors’ glaring unreliability still shines through. 
B. Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., L.L.C.  
In March 2016, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Dupuy v. NMC 
Operating Co., L.L.C., which proved to be an example of a broad application 
of the Coleman factors.119 A patient of the Spine Hospital of Louisiana, 
Richard Dupuy, allegedly developed a post-operative infection following 
spine surgery.120 Dupuy claimed that the hospital had failed to “properly 
maintain and service equipment utilized in the sterilization of surgical 
                                                                                                             
 113. Id. at 532 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
 114. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 316. 
 115. LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 529. 
 116. See, e.g., Billeaudeau v. Opelouses Gen. Hosp. Auth., 189 So. 3d 562 (La. 
Ct. App. 2016). 
 117. See, e.g., id. 
 118. See, e.g., Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., 187 So. 3d 436 (La. 2016). 
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instruments.”121 The hospital filed a dilatory exception of prematurity,122 
arguing that the claim fell under the MMA and thus first needed to be heard 
by a medical review panel.123 
The district court disagreed with the hospital, finding that the claim 
should be governed by general tort liability.124 Following the First Circuit 
Court of Appeal’s denial of the hospital’s writ, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
granted the writ and reversed the trial court’s decision.125 After establishing 
that the hospital was a “qualified health care provider” as required by the 
MMA, the Court applied each Coleman factor and concluded that the 
plaintiffs’ allegation of improper maintenance constituted medical 
malpractice under the MMA.126 
Analyzing the first Coleman factor, the Court determined Dupuy’s claim 
was “treatment related.”127 The Court cited cases in which “infectious diseases 
acquired during surgical procedures [were considered] ‘treatment related.’”128 
The Court found that a hospital’s “alleged failure to ‘properly maintain and 
service all equipment used in the sterilization process’ is an extension of the 
general duty to render professional services related to medical treatment and 
is ‘treatment related.’”129 The claims of the Dupuy case and those cases cited 
are distinguishable, however. Unlike the cases cited by the Court,130 Dupuy’s 
claim was not of negligence on behalf of the doctor or nurses in failing to 
sterilize equipment; rather, Dupuy’s claim concerned the hospital’s failure to 
properly maintain and service sterilization equipment.131 
Failing to maintain and service hospital equipment has been found in 
other cases not to be “treatment related” but to fall under general tort 
liability.132 Thus, Dupuy’s claim of failure to maintain and service 
                                                                                                             
 121. Id. at 436–37. 
 122. In Louisiana, the dilatory exception is a means of defense aimed at 
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sterilization equipment should have resulted in tort liability, as it was more 
aligned with cases like Blevins v. Hamilton Medical Center and Williamson 
v. Hospital Service District No. 1.133 Those cases involved allegations of 
failing to maintain and repair equipment properly within the hospital, namely 
a hospital bed and a wheelchair.134 Finding that such maintenance and repair 
were not related directly to actual treatment of the patient, the Court concluded 
in both cases that those actions could not be considered malpractice.135 
In Blevins, the Court found that poor maintenance of the hospital bed, 
which resulted in a knee injury, was completely distinct from the treatment 
the patient received for his infection.136 Similarly, the failure to maintain the 
sterilization equipment was distinct from Dupuy’s surgery. Such maintenance 
occurred before Dupuy ever entered the hospital and could have affected any 
other patient receiving care at the hospital. In Dupuy, the Court ignored the 
substance of the plaintiff’s claim and instead looked at the injury—an 
infection—to align the case with other jurisprudence.137 
A Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal case, Cashio v. Baton Rouge 
General Hospital, arguably supports the majority’s opinion in Dupuy.138 In 
Cashio, the court held that “treatment” includes “the furnishing of a clean and 
                                                                                                             
2004); LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hosp., L.L.C., 966 So. 2d 519, 525 (La. 
2007). 
 133. Blevins, 959 So. 2d 440; see also Williamson, 888 So. 2d 782. 
 134. Blevins, 959 So. 2d 440; Williamson, 888 So. 2d 782. 
 135. See Blevins, 959 So. 2d at 444; see also Williamson, 888 So. 2d at 790–91. 
 136. Blevins, 959 So. 2d at 446. 
 137. See Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., 187 So. 3d 436, 445 (La. 2015). By 
the end of the opinion, the court concluded that “the plaintiff’s allegations 
regarding failure to sterilize the equipment used to sanitize surgical instruments 
fall under the MMA.” Id. This wording is a clear alteration of the plaintiff’s claim. 
This type of alteration is exactly what the LaCoste Court cautioned against: 
[P]laintiffs do not allege a “failure to transfer,” but rather, they allege 
that the defendant failed to implement an adequate evacuation plan, 
failed to have in place a plan to transfer patients in the event of a 
mandatory evacuation, and failed to have a facility available for the 
transfer of patients. While a failure to transfer may relate to medical 
malpractice in another case, [the claims alleged here are] not “treatment 
related” or the result of the dereliction of professional medical skill, 
based on the factual allegations to which our review is limited. . . . As 
we cautioned in Williamson, “[a]n expansive reading of the definition of 
medical malpractice contained in the MMA runs counter to our previous 
holdings that coverage of the Medical Malpractice Act should be strictly 
construed.” 
LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 526. 
 138. Cashio v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 378 So. 2d 182 (La. Ct. App. 1979). 
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sterile environment for all patients.”139 The Dupuy Court found that “proper 
sterilization of surgical instruments is at the very core of the ‘treatment’ of a 
patient.”140 The problem with this comparison, however, is that Dupuy’s 
claim is not one of proper sterilization but one of proper maintenance and 
service of hospital equipment.141 
Regarding “whether the wrong requires expert medical evidence to 
determine whether the appropriate standard of care was breached,”142 the 
Dupuy Court concluded that expert medical testimony was necessary because 
“whether instruments were in fact properly sterilized is a question that 
requires medical expertise.”143 Again, the Court focused on sterilization, 
providing an example of a medical expert being needed to explain the protocol 
of such maintenance.144 The issue, however, was not simply whether the 
equipment was sterilized; rather, Dupuy’s claim was for failure to maintain 
and service sterilization equipment.145 
The Court in Williamson recognized that expert testimony may be 
required to establish the duty to maintain a wheelchair and the breach of that 
duty.146 The Court, however, found that such evidence need not be medical.147 
Expert testimony is not the same as expert medical testimony. Thus, Dupuy is 
more aligned with Williamson in the respect that although expert evidence 
may be put forth, that evidence need not be supplied by a medical expert. The 
plaintiffs in Dupuy alleged that the service and maintenance was done by 
“plant operations.”148 No expert medical evidence would be necessary to 
establish the proper standard of care in maintaining and servicing the 
sterilization equipment. 
The Court did not address the third factor, “whether the pertinent act or 
omission involved assessment of the patient’s condition,” or the sixth factor, 
“whether the tort alleged was intentional.”149 Instead, it briefly mentioned in 
a footnote that it would not address these factors because the “parties agree 
that factors three and six do not have relevance in this case.”150 This decision 
by the Court is confusing because the maintenance and service of sterilization 
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equipment did not involve the assessment of the patient’s condition in any 
way. Thus, the third factor likely would have favored the plaintiffs in this case. 
The Court next addressed the fourth factor, “whether an incident occurred 
in the context of a physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of 
activities which a hospital is licensed to perform.”151 The Court discussed the 
Hospital Licensing Law, enacted in 1961, which “directed the Department of 
Health and Hospitals to adopt ‘rules, regulations, and minimum standards’ 
that must be met by every licensed hospital.”152 Among the standards listed 
are those relating to “sanitary conditions, practices and environment and 
sanitary and sterilization procedures and practices designed to avoid sources 
and transmission of infections, including regulations governing the isolation 
of patients with communicable diseases.”153 The Court found that this statute 
required hospitals to have clearly established sterilization procedures to 
maintain operating licenses.154 The problem with this finding is that Dupuy’s 
claim was not an allegation of improper hospital procedures, nor was it an 
allegation of improper adherence to the hospital’s procedure. The allegation 
was that, despite having a procedure in place for properly sterilizing 
equipment and following that procedure, the hospital failed to service and 
maintain that equipment properly. 
In a footnote, the Court found that, although the parties to the suit argued 
about the second element of the factor, the incident also “occurred in the 
context of a physician-patient relationship.”155 Because the exact source of 
Dupuy’s infection had not yet been determined, the Court found that the 
“incident” that caused the infection was ultimately the surgery itself, 
regardless of the origin of the initial source.156 The “incident,” however, which 
is the subject of the claim, was the maintenance and service failure.157 The 
first element of this factor likely was not discussed by either party because it 
did not seem plausible that the service and maintenance of sterilization 
equipment would be considered within the context of a physician-patient 
relationship because those actions occur before a patient even enters a 
hospital. 
In analyzing the fifth factor, “whether the injury would have occurred if 
the patient had not sought treatment,”158 the Court found this factor clearly 
favored the hospital because Dupuy’s injury occurred during the treatment 
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period.159 Similarly to Justice Knoll’s dissent in LaCoste,160 the Court applied 
a “but-for” standard that would be difficult to overcome on any set of facts—
of course a patient will not suffer the injury if he never seeks treatment at the 
hospital. Therefore, using a “but-for” standard always will favor the plaintiff. 
Consequently, with all factors leaning in favor of “malpractice,” the Court 
held that Dupuy’s claim fell within the scope of the MMA.161 
The Coleman factors’ susceptibility to dissimilar applications of similar 
facts demonstrates their unpredictable and unreliable nature. Factors used to 
determine malpractice should result only in a narrow application of the MMA 
consistent with Louisiana’s public policy concern for tort victims’ ability to 
recover. The commonly used Coleman factors provide an insufficient means 
of determining whether claims constitute malpractice under the MMA. 
Recognizing their insufficiency, several Louisiana courts have chosen not to 
apply the factors in post-Coleman decisions.162 Thus, in light of these apparent 
issues of inconsistency in applying the law and veering away from established 
public policy, a solution to this problem is necessary. 
IV. THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CURE 
Because of Louisiana’s concern with denying tort victims full 
recovery,163 the Louisiana Legislature should provide courts with a reliable 
test for determining whether a claim constitutes malpractice under the MMA. 
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court attempted to solidify the malpractice 
analysis by implementing the Coleman factors, that attempt was in vain. As a 
statutorily governed area of law, defining “malpractice” entails much more 
than establishing an easy-to-apply test. To prevent divergent opinions, courts 
need more than broad definitions for guidance when dealing with complicated 
and specific facts. The Legislature should provide Louisiana courts with a 
narrow definition of malpractice that construes the MMA strictly. This 
definition should explain clearly what claims constitute malpractice so that 
Louisiana courts can make these determinations with consistency. 
As an intermediate solution, Louisiana courts deciding malpractice 
claims should apply an altered version of the current Coleman factors that 
emphasizes a narrow application. The first Coleman factor should be altered 
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from “whether the particular wrong is ‘treatment related’ or caused by a 
dereliction of professional skill”164 to “whether the particular wrong alleged 
is related to the treatment the patient received or caused by a dereliction of 
professional skill.” Including the word “alleged” will steer the courts toward 
focusing on the actual allegations before them. Modifying a plaintiff’s 
allegations, as was done in Dupuy and in Justice Knoll’s LaCoste dissent,165 
is not the duty of the courts. Rather, courts must focus on the language of the 
plaintiff’s allegations, and to not do so is insupportable.166 Moreover, 
amending the phrase “treatment related” to “related to the treatment that 
patient received” will help the court focus on the particular patient’s actual 
treatment rather than going down the chain of causation as Justice Knoll did 
in LaCoste.167 
The second Coleman factor should be amended from “whether the wrong 
requires expert medical evidence to determine whether the appropriate 
standard of care was breached”168 to “whether the wrong alleged requires 
expert medical evidence to determine whether the appropriate standard of care 
was breached.” Again, incorporating “alleged” will help the courts focus on 
the actual claim presented. This change will aid in preventing scenarios 
similar to that of LaCoste, in which Justice Knoll discussed the need for expert 
medical evidence in determining the standard of care for transferring patients 
when “failure to transfer” was not the plaintiff’s claim.169 Further, placing 
emphasis on the medical nature of expert testimony will remind the court that 
a medical expert, rather than any individual employed by a hospital, must be 
required.170 
The third factor, “whether the pertinent act or omission involved 
assessment of the patient’s condition,”171 should be amended to “whether the 
alleged act or omission occurred as part of the assessment of the patient’s 
condition.” Once again, replacing “pertinent” with “alleged” will help the 
court focus on the actual claim in the case. Additionally, substituting 
“involved” with “occurred as part of” stresses that the “act or omission” needs 
to be part of assessing the patient—not merely somehow involved in the 
eventual care of the patient. 
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The fourth factor, “whether an incident occurred in the context of a 
physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of activities which a 
hospital is licensed to perform,”172 should be modified to read “whether the 
alleged incident occurred in the context of the physician-patient relationship, 
or was within the scope of activities which a hospital is licensed to perform.” 
Inserting “alleged” ensures yet again that the court’s focus remains on the 
actual claim at hand. 
The fifth factor, “whether the injury would have occurred if the patient 
had not sought treatment,”173 should be removed altogether. As the Court has 
discussed, this factor suggests a “but-for” analysis that almost always will be 
satisfied.174 If a patient suffers an injury in a hospital, it is likely that the patient 
would not have suffered the injury if he had never entered the hospital. The 
unreliability of this fifth factor was made clear in LaCoste.175 As the majority 
indicated, there are very few scenarios in which a patient could suffer an injury 
in a hospital that would have occurred even if he had not sought treatment 
there.176 The only exception to this factor leaning in favor of malpractice 
established by jurisprudence is when the injury could have occurred to a 
visitor of the hospital.177 In that scenario, however, the previous four factors 
would lead to the conclusion of general tort liability considering the victim 
was not a patient of the hospital. 
Similarly, the sixth factor, “whether the tort alleged was intentional,”178 
also should be removed because it carries no weight, considering the MMA’s 
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definition of malpractice begins with “any unintentional tort.”179 When 
determining whether the MMA applies, the analysis begins with the definitions 
established within the MMA. As the Court found in both LaCoste and Dupuy, 
these factors simply provide assistance in determining malpractice,180 making 
this factor wholly unnecessary.181 
Use of these altered Coleman factors by Louisiana courts provides a 
starting point, but ultimately the Legislature should amend the MMA to 
provide a clearer definition of malpractice that is aligned with the state’s 
public policy concerns for avoiding derogation of tort victims’ rights. 
Additionally, incorporating the above-amended factors into the MMA may 
assist the Legislature in achieving that objective. 
CONCLUSION 
Louisiana courts have applied these non-Louisiana based, broad, 
unreliable factors with little consistency since 2002. When addressing the vital 
public policy concern with limiting tort victims’ right to recovery, Louisiana 
courts should have a straightforward, Louisiana-based approach to making 
malpractice determinations. The Coleman factors, though sometimes applied 
with Louisiana’s public policy in mind, are susceptible to varying 
interpretations. This susceptibility shows that the Coleman factors are an 
insufficient test that fails to accomplish the public policy goals of Louisiana 
under the MMA. 
The ideal solution is to amend Louisiana’s MMA to provide a clearer 
definition of “malpractice” so courts will achieve non-conflicting results. 
Considering courts’ familiarity with the Coleman factors, an alteration of 
those factors that emphasizes construing the MMA strictly would be a simple 
and efficient starting point. 
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